Adaptation, multilevel selection and organismality: A clash of perspectives by Clarke, Ellen
DRAFT




The concept of adaptation is pivotal to modern evolutionary thinking, but it has long been the subject of controversy, especially in respect of the relative roles of selection versus constraints in explaining the traits of organisms. This paper tackles a different problem for the concept of adaptation: its interpretation in light of multilevel selection theory. In particular, I arbitrate a dispute that has broken out between the proponents of rival perspectives on multilevel adaptations. 




What is an adaptation? Although it is easy to suggest examples of adaptation—a bird’s wing, an eye, a startle reflex—to define one is much more challenging. The status of adaptation always belongs to traits - structures or behaviours, parts of a phenotype. But what sort of trait? An adaptation is a trait that has a particular value or purpose. It is good at something, or good for something. Natural selection is nowadays implicated somehow in expanding upon these sentences. Natural selection explains adaptations, in that natural selection brings adaptations into existence.  But little more can be said without entering into controversy.
Philosophical disputes about adaptation have tended to focus on just how important adaptation is. Adaptationism is accused of exaggerating the prevalence of adaptations amongst the traits of organisms, and thus of exaggerating the role of natural selection in explaining the appearance of the living world. The anti-adaptationist Stephen Jay Gould famously complained about the telling of what he called “just-so stories,” which characterise traits as perfectly fulfilling some concocted function (Gould 1978). Gould assigned most traits a much lowlier status: as imperfect; as lucky accidents; or as barely-functioning salvage-jobs. Instead of elevating natural selection as an all-powerful designing force, anti-adaptationists see the living world as testament to a history of drift, of developmental constraints and of brute luck. So the traditional problem of adaptation concerns, very broadly speaking, the extent to which the traits of organisms are shaped by natural selection, rather than by other, non-selective, causes.
I’ll be looking at an orthogonal dimension of the problem of adaptation: whether adapted traits must be considered always as possessed by organisms. Our default view used to be that adaptations are present at a fixed hierarchical level—the level whose units we refer to as “dog,” “person,” or “tree.” In fact, the traditional picture assumed a cosy proximity between adaptations, organisms, and selection—they all occurred at the same level. However, beginning in the 1970s this view was revolutionised by the realisation that these units have been constructed, in a process of “major evolutionary transition,” out of smaller building blocks (Margulis 1970; Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995). Our best current science tells us that most of the living things we observe around us are serially compounded entities: nested aggregations of lower-level units which have been pushed through a major transition by natural selection. So even if it were the case that selection presently acts at just one level, it is impossible that it has always acted at just this one level, because this level hasn’t always been around (Okasha 2001) ​[1]​. The reality of major transitions therefore forces us to accept that selection can act at different levels of a compositional hierarchy. To put the same point another way, group selection is real, because “the organisms of today were the groups of past ages” (Wilson 2015, 29). 
The transitions revolution has transformed the levels of selection debate. My question is, how does acceptance of multilevel selection oblige us to revise our ideas about adaptation? In order to extend the concept of adaptation to a hierarchical setting we must relax the assumption that adaptations occur only at one fixed hierarchical level and determine whether they can be borne by the units at higher and lower compositional levels. I call this an additional dimension to the problem of adaptation because as well as settling the question whether selection is behind the emergence of some trait, as opposed to something like constraint, we are forced additionally to determine the hierarchical level at which selection is acting.
I focus on two pairs of authors, both of whom have, in light of major transitions, reconfigured the traditional relationship between bearing adaptations, being an organism, and being acted on by natural selection. But the pairs have arrived at differing configurations, and their differences have recently led them into explicit conflict with one another. Arbitrating this dispute is valuable because it illuminates the different ways in which the three core concepts of evolutionary biology can be situated with respect to one another. It is also interesting because the two pairs represent the state of the art of opposite poles in a longstanding dichotomy concerning hierarchical evolution and the levels of selection. 
Andy Gardner and Alan Grafen are biologists in what I’ll call a reductionist tradition, whose members have included Bill Hamilton, George Williams, Richard Dawkins and Stuart West. The tradition includes ‘kin selection’ or ‘inclusive fitness’ theory (Hamilton 1964; 1970), the ‘Selfish Gene’ tradition (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1982) and the Formal Darwinism Project (Grafen 2007; 2014). All of these are reductionistic in so far as they reserve a privileged role for lower-level units, especially genes, although in recent versions the focus of agency is shifted up to the level of the common-sense organism (our “dog” and “tree”), rather than to genes​[2]​.
Opposing the reductionists, are what I’ll call the holists—biologists and philosophers who defend the reality or significance of higher levels of selection. Sometimes called “group selectionists,” sometimes “multilevel selectionists,” this tradition can be traced through Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, Rick Michod, and Samir Okasha as well as my focal authors, Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. 
The two sides have tended to favour different ways of carving up natural selection. Reductionists carve selection up into the correlation between an individual’s traits and its fitness, on the one hand, and a correlation between the individual’s traits and the fitness of other individuals with which it share genes, on the other hand. This partition allows the reductionists to “capture how individuals can influence the transmission of their genes to future generations by influencing their own reproductive success or that of related individuals” (West & Gardner 2013, R577). 
My “holists,” by contrast, carve selection up into a competition between individuals within groups, and a competition between groups​[3]​. I call them “holists” because they prefer not to give priority to lower-level units such as genes or organisms. The holistic model is level-neutral, in that the members of the groups can be genes, or cells, or unicellular organisms, or multicellular organisms, and even colonies of multicellular organisms​[4]​. Like most dichotomies, this one is messy, and there has been much diversity and change within each side. Gardner and Grafen, and Sober and Wilson, express some of the most recent sophistications of each view. 
The transitions revolution has transformed the levels of selection debate but, perhaps surprisingly, has not made it go away (Okasha 2001). In recent years there has been majority convergence on the view that reductionistic models (in other words kin selection or inclusive fitness models) are mathematically equivalent to holistic models (group selection or multilevel models). For example, Gardner writes, “It is now increasingly understood that separation of natural selection into within-group and between-group components (the “group-selection partition”) is a perfectly appropriate alternative to the separation of natural selection into direct and indirect components (the “kin-selection partition”) (Gardner 2013, 105). Despite this, the two sides remain in opposition. The attacks launched by each side are interesting in their own right, but the analysis I offer also provides some reason to doubt the extent to which formal equivalence between two models can be understood as trivialising their differences.

2. Two views about multilevel adaptation 

Let’s begin with consensus. Both sides agree that adaptation stands in a very special relationship with selection, in that only selection can explain or give rise to adaptation. Adaptation entails that there has been selection, in philosophical speak. Both sides connect the notion of adaptation to that of purpose or function, and understand that function as being fixed by natural selection in some way.
Both sides allow that selection can occur at multiple levels, and assume that we should treat the special relation between selection and adaptation as level-specific, so that adaptation at a level implies selection at that same level (Sober & Wilson 2011, 463; Gardner 2013, 109) ​[5]​. 
Both sides are content, furthermore, to understand Price’s covariance approach as answering questions about the hierarchical level at which selection is acting (Price 1970; 1972; Okasha 2006). On this approach, selection acts at the individual/lower level only if there is covariance between the traits and fitnesses of particles within groups. Selection acts at the group/higher level only if there is covariance between the traits and fitness of whole groups​[6]​. The two levels of selection, in other words, correspond to different terms of Price’s multilevel equation (Price 1972). This agreement is significant, in that it amounts to the reductionists agreeing to utilise the holists’ manner of carving up selection into within-group and between-group terms. Of course, such agreement seems perfectly reasonable, on the assumption that the different methods of carving are mathematically equivalent anyway.
Distance emerges between the two sides in respect of exactly how much selection needs to occur at the focal level in order for traits at that level to qualify as adaptations. Gardner and Grafen provide an account that uses a formal optimization program to derive a claim about when we can expect adaptations to appear at a particular hierarchical level. They conclude that adaptations will appear at a level only when selection at the level below is completely suppressed. In practice, this occurs in two scenarios: if the parts of the unit at the focal level are genetic clones of one another, or if the unit at the focal level has evolved policing mechanisms which function to eliminate competition amongst its parts (Gardner & Grafen 2009, p.660). Gardner codifies this supplement to Williams’ Principle as “Maynard Smith’s Principle: Adaptation of an entity at any level of biological organization requires the absence of selection within entities at that level.” (Gardner 2013, 109). 
Sober and Wilson also make the existence of adaptation at a level conditional on facts about how much selection takes place at the level below, but they say, “We think it is more useful to use ‘group adaptation’ to label traits that evolved because group selection dominated the selection process” (Sober & Wilson 2011, 465). In other words, they argue that more than fifty per cent, or half, of the total selection force (the sum of both Price partitions) should act at the relevant level before we call the traits at that level “adaptations.”
What is behind these different decisions? Everyone conceives of adaptations in teleological terms, as serving a purpose or function. Gardner and Grafen can be understood as motivated primarily to identify what this purpose is—to find the “maximand.” On their account all adaptations serve the same purpose, which is the maximisation of inclusive fitness. In other words, an adaptation is a trait that is good for increasing the representation of the bearer’s genes in future populations.
We might call this an ‘ultimate’ function, in addition to the proximate functions carried out by particular traits. For example, a polar bear’s white fur serves the function of retaining body heat, but it has only evolved to serve this function in so far as the retention of body heat has helped polar bear white fur genes to increase in frequency. Focusing on this ultimate function allows Gardner and Grafen to capture two aspects of adaptation: the fit between organisms and their environments, and also the fit of the parts of an organism to one another. “Individual organisms appear contrived as if towards some purpose; a quality that is evident only because all the adaptations wielded by the individual appear contrived for the same purpose” (Gardner & Grafen 2009, p.665). Gardner and Grafen run these two together, assuming that the organism can be well fitted to its environment only if its parts are well fitted to one another, in the same way that a pocket watch achieves its function of reliable time keeping only if each of its cogs and springs works in harmony with the others (Paley 1802; Gardner 2009; 2013).
It is in order to preserve this commonality of purpose that Gardner and Grafen argue that a trait is an adaptation only when its bearer is an exclusive level of selection, with no possibility of selection taking place at a lower level. A group trait might be rightly called a group adaptation, they think, but only under very special circumstances—in “scenarios where groups comprise genetically identical individuals, or where within-group competition is repressed” (Gardner & Grafen 2009). In fact, Gardner recognises that real-life organisms won’t meet this ideal and weakens the view to accommodate “negligible selection.” What is crucial, he argues, is that there is not significant conflict between the parts of the unit, because only in the absence of conflicts can the unit evolve the harmonious common-purpose that they take to be characteristic of true adaptation (Gardner 2013, 111). 
While Gardner and Grafen identify a single maximand which any selected population is always moving towards, Sober and Wilson’s vision has conflict at its heart. They picture adaptations as able to serve different purposes, at different hierarchical levels. In choosing their favoured fifty per cent threshold, Sober and Wilson are motivated by cases in which there is oppositional selection acting at two hierarchical levels simultaneously. Altruism, on their definition, is a trait which is favoured by between-group selection, but disfavoured by within-group selection (Sober & Wilson 1998, 26; Sober & Wilson 2011, 463). They conceptualise altruism as pulled in different directions by two opposing forces. Altruism can spread, therefore, only if the between-group force is stronger than the within-group force​[7]​. 




Punch one: Gardner and Grafen stand accused of contradiction
In their 2011 paper, Sober and Wilson argue that Gardner and Grafen hold a logically inconsistent set of commitments: 

1. Williams’ Principle: Adaptation at a level implies selection at that same level.
2. Maynard Smith’s principle: Adaptation at a level implies no selection at the lower level.
3. Reductionism: Adaptation always occurs at the level of the individual organism.
4. Groups can bear adaptations.

To see that these are inconsistent, assume a case in which groups are adapted. Proposition 3 tells us that the individuals bear adaptations. If the individuals are adapted, then they must be acted on by selection, according to proposition 1. But if the individuals are acted on by selection, then proposition 2 tells us that the groups cannot bear adaptations, which contradicts Proposition 4 and our initial assumption. 
Are Gardner and Grafen guilty? It certainly seems that they need something like proposition 3 in order to maintain their commitment to inclusive fitness theory. They want to say that all adaptations are adaptations at the individual level—because they maximise the inclusive fitness of individuals—even while some rare phenomena, such as the waggle dance language of a honeybee colony (Gardner, pers. comm.), or the policing behaviours of the same (Gardner & Grafen 2009, 666), might properly be considered group-level adaptations as well. 
However, the logical contradiction depends on the meaning of “selection at the lower level” or “selection of the individual” staying fixed. Sober and Wilson always use “lower-level selection” and “individual selection” to refer to within-group selection, as opposed to between-group selection​[8]​. When Gardner states Maynard Smith’s Principle in 2014 he is careful to use this same meaning: “Adaptation of an entity at any level of biological organization requires the absence of selection within entities at that level” (Gardner 2014, 109).
However, there is a second way in which “individual selection” can be used, to refer to the global selection acting on individuals, ignoring population structure (Sober 2011, 223)​[9]​. This is a single-level measure of selection, which collapses the two components of the Price partition into a single term. Muddles often arise as a consequence of different authors using these terms differently​[10]​. It may be that Gardner and Grafen sometimes use this second meaning, although they certainly don’t flag it as such. When Gardner and Grafen claim that adaptation always obtains at the level of the individual, perhaps what they mean is that individuals’ traits are always produced by global individual selection. If so, then we seem to have two rather different senses of adaptation in play. Adaptationmultilevel is a trait that is produced by selection at a level—one component of the Price partition. But Adaptationglobal is a trait that is produced by global individual selection. 
If we assume that propositions 1 and 2 involve only Adaptationmultilevel, and we reinterpret Proposition 3 as saying that all Adaptationmultilevels are simultaneously  Adaptationglobals, then the purported contradiction is removed. But the interpretive work here is rather radical. Why don’t Gardner and Grafen say this? 
It is the movement between these two notions that allows Gardner and Grafen to hold on to the reductionist claim that lower levels have some sort of evolutionary priority, but without having to deny group selection. What would Sober and Wilson make of my reinterpreted Proposition 3? They will agree that broad individualism correctly predicts the outcome of multilevel selection processes. A trait will only increase in the global population if on average its bearers are fitter than the bearers of the competing trait. But nobody will deny this - it is tautologous. To call weak altruism an individual adaptation would miss the point that altruism enhances the absolute fitness of (brings mutual benefits to) only those individuals that find themselves in groups of the right sort—groups with a high enough frequency of altruists. In groups with a low frequency of altruists, altruism is costly to absolute fitness. If we call their altruism an “individually adaptive trait” then we obscure all the important information about the mechanism in virtue of which altruists can prosper (Sober and Wilson call this “averaging fallacy” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 33). So Sober and Wilson have no interest in Adaptationglobal—to them the outcome of global selection is mere book keeping, and tells us nothing about the relevant causal processes. 
So does acceptance of multilevel selection oblige us to accept multilevel adaptation? While it appears that both pairs of authors say yes, in fact only Sober and Wilson present an account in which there is truly adaptation coexisting at multiple hierarchical levels. For in Gardner and Grafen’s picture, there is Adaptationmultilevel which is level-neutral, in that it can emerge at any level of biological hierarchy, but it can only ever exist at one level at a time. Adaptationglobal, with which Adaptationmultilevel does coexist, is a different notion. 

Punch two: Sober and Wilson stand accused of paradox
Gardner and Grafen, for their part, accuse Sober and Wilson’s position of paradox, because they give a particular kind of mechanism the status of both cause and consequence of adaptation (Gardner & Grafen 2009, 667). A “policing mechanism,” both sides agree, is a mechanism possessed by some living unit which acts to police or suppress selective conflict within that unit. Germ-soma separation, bottleneck life cycles, and worker policing behaviours in social insects, are all examples of policing mechanisms, which determine the extent to which some unit is able to undergo within-unit selection (Clarke 2013, 421). Policing mechanisms are implicated by both sides in the evolution of higher-level adaptations, because they control the all-important quantity of lower-level selection. But what does this imply about the ordering of events during a major transition?
In 1998 and in 2011 Sober and Wilson say that some policing mechanisms are adaptations: “the mechanisms that currently limit within-individual selection are not a happy coincidence but are themselves adaptations that evolved by natural selection” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 97). They give the example of a weakly altruistic punishing behaviour, which benefits the group by discouraging cheaters, but imposes a cost on the individual. The cost to the individual entails that the trait cannot evolve by within-group selection, as a matter of definition. It can evolve only by between-group selection, they say, and must therefore, by Williams’ Principle, be a group adaptation. “Superorganisms [they use Gardner & Grafen’s term here, to mean “adapted group”] are a possible product of the group selection process, not a precondition for the process” (Sober and Wilson 2011, 466). 
Gardner and Grafen claim that Sober and Wilson have things the wrong way round. Policing mechanisms cannot be understood as group adaptations, contra Sober and Wilson, because until they are in place there can be no higher-level adaptations. “The superorganism [i.e. the adapted group] comes into existence only after these mechanisms are already established” (Gardner & Grafen 2009, 667). But, of course, it is only on Gardner and Grafen’s own definition of a group adaptation that policing is a necessary precondition. Sober and Wilson require only majority group selection, and this they assume to be possible in the absence of policing mechanisms, in which case there is no problem in their supposing that adaptations such as policing mechanisms evolve in the absence of prior policing mechanisms.
Furthermore, Sober and Wilson’s picture of the temporal priority between policing mechanisms and adaptations contains an extra element. While Gardner and Grafen define higher-level organisms in terms of adaptations, Sober and Wilson assume that higher-level adaptation can occur in the absence of a higher-level organism. A group can bear adaptations, if there is sufficient group selection. And policing mechanisms are among the adaptations that a group can bear. In order to qualify as a (super)organism, on the other hand, the group must meet further, independent, criteria. The possession of policing mechanisms is necessary—but not sufficient. An adapted, policed group qualifies as an organism, according to Sober and Wilson, only if it meets the extra criterion of functional organisation (Wilson & Sober 1989, 350).
As a consequence, our two pairs of authors imagine a different temporal ordering of key events in an evolutionary transition. Sober and Wilson assume that you start with groups of individuals​[11]​. They imagine some selection acting on the groups. If selection acting between the groups outweighs selection acting within the groups then you can start to see the appearance of group-level adaptations. Amongst these might be policing mechanisms. And if the groups additionally begin to exhibit functional organization, then we can start to call them “organisms.” 
Let’s assume Gardner and Grafen also start with groups of individuals and some selection acting on groups. They assume that the next available step is the appearance of policing mechanisms. After these are in place we can assume that selection acts exclusively between the groups, rather than within them, and so the groups qualify as superorganisms. Finally, as a last step, we can expect that selection acting on the superorganisms will begin to create higher-level adaptations.
These are different pictures, but neither is obviously internally inconsistent. On Sober and Wilson’s picture, policing mechanisms are higher-level adaptations, but on Gardner and Grafen’s they are not. Sober and Wilson’s verdict is conditional on them assuming that a group can bear adaptations even if there is some selective conflict within the group. But this is a conceptual choice, and in no way commits them to logical error, as Gardner and Grafen accused. As long as one makes the right adjustments elsewhere in the overall puzzle, both of these views are viable.
Sober and Wilson say that the appearance of policing mechanisms has to be a “happy coincidence” for Gardner and Grafen, because, unlike them, they cannot appeal to higher-level selection to explain the evolution of policing (Sober & Wilson 1998, 97). Yet one option would be for Gardner and Grafen to appeal to within-group kin selection to explain policing. For example, kin selection theory expects worker insects to prefer egg-laying by the queen to egg-laying by their fellow workers, to whose offspring they would be less closely related. Kin selection acting within the group can therefore explain the evolution of egg-eating amongst worker insects (Ratnieks & Wenseleers 1988; Bourke 2011​[12]​). This could give rise to what Birch called a ‘crane of coercion’, in which within-colony conflict generates policing mechanisms that then suppress within-colony conflict (Birch 2012). Sober and Wilson, on the other hand, are committed to the possibility of between-group selection being dominant over within-group selection, even in the absence of policing mechanisms, so that higher-level adaptations (such as policing mechanisms) can occur. 
Furthermore, Sober and Wilson have introduced a dislocation between organisms and adaptations, such that there can be adapted groups that are not organisms. This is drastic. Our intuitive sense that being adapted coincides with being an organism is so strong that it has led some authors to define organisms as bearers of adaptations (Gould & Lloyd 1999). And it is just not clear that the dislocation is necessary, or what is achieved by it. The concept of the organism ends up as something of a spare part in Sober and Wilson’s picture. They hold that some collectives come to be functionally organized, in addition to being adapted, but we are left with no explanation for why. They say that “When a group of organisms is functionally organized, its members coordinate their activities for a common purpose, just like the organs of an organism and the parts of a can opener” (Wilson 2015, 9). We will need some account from Sober and Wilson of what sort of common purpose they have in mind. We can assume they do not mean inclusive fitness maximisation. An alternative would be to lean on Wright’s selected effects account of function, on which purpose emerges as a consequence of a selection process (Wright 1973). The problem is this would imply that functional organisation emerges as a consequence of a common selection pressure acting on all the parts of the organism. But in that case it looks like “functional organisation” would be end up playing the same role for Sober and Wilson as does “adaptation” for Gardner and Grafen.

We have seen that while neither side commits the simple logical mistakes they accuse each other of, each of them are committed to some further differentiating commitments, summarised in Box 1. below. The punches mostly missed their targets, although we saw that Gardner and Grafen duck one blow only by switching, unannounced, between two different notions of “adaptation” in order to reconcile their reductionism with multilevel selection. The price of Sober and Wilson’s escape from paradox, on the other hand, is that they have  severed the concept “adaptation” from that of “organism.”

4. The big picture

We can now see that, in spite of claims for the formal equivalence of their views about how to model selection at multiple hierarchical levels, the focal pairs of authors hold a number of divergent commitments (detailed in box 1). At this point it is fruitful to step back from the details of the criticisms made by each party against the other, to examine the reasons each party arrived at the picture they defend.

Box 1.
Sober and Wilson’s commitments	Gardner and Grafen’s commitments
Adaptation at a level implies selection at that same level (“Williams’ Principle”)	Adaptationmultilevel at a level implies selection at that same level (“Williams’ Principle”)Adaptationglobal implies global individual selection
Adaptation at a level implies less than 50% selection at the lower level	Adaptationmultilevel at a level implies zero selection at the lower level (“Maynard Smith’s Principle”)
Adaptation sometimes occurs at higher levels in opposition to lower levels (Conflict assumption)	Adaptationglobal always occurs at the level of the individual (by which they mean the common sense “organism” (Reductionism)
Policing mechanisms are higher-level adaptations	Policing mechanisms are not higher-level adaptations
Non-organisms can bear adaptations	Adaptationmultilevel at a level implies (super)organismality at that level.

Sober and Wilson’s central motivation is to maintain space for conflict between adaptations at different levels. “There is a robust alternative to portraying natural selection as a process that always leads toward the optimization of individual fitness. Natural selection can also be understood as the net effect of opposing forces” (Wilson 2011) ​[13]​. They want to emphasize that oppositional levels of selection will often lead to evolutionary trade-offs, in which the optimal outcome for the individual differs from the optimal outcome for the group. It is paramount in their overall schema that our concept of “adaptation” should reflect the reality of such conflict.
For Gardner and Grafen, by contrast, all the details are in the service of maintaining the focus on selection as a maximising or optimizing process. They maintain that if we allow talk of adaptations as being bad for individuals then we lose the ability to account for the teleology, the purpose, apparent in the design of living things. So while Sober and Wilson hold that the adaptations at different levels can have different functions, and that this will sometimes bring them into conflict with one another, Gardner and Grafen insist that adaptations at different levels can only ever be harmonious with one another, in the service of one universal biological function. 
In some ways these divergent motivations are symptoms of the traditional adaptationism disputes. On one side we have the adaptationists, focused on optimization, on the other we have those with a commitment to evolutionary outcomes that are intermediate, imperfect and conflicted. For Sober, the connection of adaptation to selection is an important semantic commitment—to call something an adaptation is to make a claim about its history, rather than about its current adaptive value (Sober 1984, 208). This distinction is required to allow room for traits to serve a particular function without ever having been selected for that role—for Gould’s spandrels, in other words (Gould 1979). 
Yet, there is more going on than a simple resurgence of those old arguments about adaptationism. It wouldn’t be correct to accuse Gardner and Grafen of supposing that organismal traits are generally optimal, for example. Gardner and Grafen say we should expect natural selection to push systems towards optimality, not that we should expect systems to be optimal. Furthermore, both sides make use of optimality reasoning—in which we assume that some of the nearby trait space consists of less fit phenotypes. Sober and Wilson utilise this sort of reasoning in their counterfactual method, which asks whether the individual would be fitter if a selection component were eliminated to suppress a trade-off (Sober & Wilson 1998, 103-18). In fact, because Sober and Wilson set a lower bar for higher-level adaptations, their picture admits many more adaptations than does Gardner and Grafen’s. 
How much, if anything, turns on this confrontation of perspectives? We can shift between the perspectives without any loss in our ability to predict evolutionary change. It is a short step to disparaging the whole matter as involving only “rival metaphors for the very same evolutionary logic and [being] thus empirically empty” (Reeve & Keller 1999, 4). But we should be aware that even if the two perspectives are formally equivalent to one another, there are also clear differences between them. What sort of differences are they? How substantive are they?  One effect, of switching from Sober and Wilson’s description to Gardner and Grafen’s, is that some adaptations will have to be redescribed as obtaining at  a different hierarchical compositional level​[14]​. There is a sort of quantitative disagreement also, in that the holist’s world will have many more adaptations in it than the reductionist’s, as a consequence of Sober and Wilson’s lower threshold. We might, further, think there is some sort of empirical disagreement to be gotten out of Gardner and Grafen’s assumption that complex design is possible only in the context of unified selection pressures, but given the inchoate nature of “design,” as well as the caveats about how much lower-level selection qualifies as “negligible,” we will not be able to construct tests to decide these matters.
There is always a danger of slipping from a local to a more global pluralism once different viewpoints are shown to be equally valid. It is important to distinguish changes in evolutionary process from changes in mere perspective (Sober & Wilson 1998, 57). It is important, furthermore, to appreciate that there are limits to perspectival pluralism. When considering a population comprised of groups within each of which there is conflict, the inclusive fitness approach and the multilevel selection approach constitute different perspectives—different ways of thinking about the same thing. As a matter of fact, rather than perspective, this first system is different from one in which there is no conflict within groups. We are not at liberty to choose whether to treat the groups as if they are subject to conflict or not. But once we turn our attention to the latter sort of system—one in which groups are exclusive, unconflicted, levels of selection—a new choice of perspectives becomes available. When selection acts only at the group level, then we can choose to frameshift a standard single-level evolutionary model up to the group level. We can choose to treat the groups as if they are organisms​[15]​. This second switch of perspective, like the first, preserves any predictions about what will happen (evolutionarily speaking) in the system. 
Perhaps, then, we can understand Gardner and Grafen as having provided formal justification for the latter sort of perspective-switch. When policing mechanisms are in place, what is good for the higher-level group is good for all of the lower-level units in the group too. So no matter which of these two levels we look at, we will make the same prediction about what will be favoured. And this is a way to explain what is special about paradigm organisms. In effect we perform exactly this trick when we treat multicellular organisms as individuals. We don’t bother counting up all the lower-level units—the cells. In so far as organisms such as pigs have policing mechanisms, it is possible for us to just ignore most of the millions of cells in the pig’s body and count it once, without introducing any distortion into our picture of pig evolutionary dynamics. And so with the units even lower down—genes. We don’t have to count all the copies of a particular allele—we just assume there is one in each cell. And this same trick works whenever some level is an exclusive level of selection—if groups of pigs were to evolve sufficient policing mechanisms to make them exclusive levels of selection we could dispense with tracking the fitness of separate pigs, and just plug the values for the whole group into a single-level model. 




Our traditional ideas about evolutionary adaptation have to be revised in light of the facts about multilevel selection and the major transitions. But the details of that revision depend on our favoured perspective on multilevel selection. I reviewed the positions adopted by proponents of two rival perspectives. I hope to have shed some light on a rather opaque disagreement between these authors in Gardner and Grafen’s 2009 paper and Sober and Wilson’s 2011 reply. But in addition, the exercise has demonstrated that there is a very complex set of relations between three concepts—adaptation, organism, and selection—that are pivotal to modern evolutionary biology. These constitute moveable pieces in the overall puzzle, so that each pair of authors achieves a picture that is internally consistent, but in order to do so they commit to various further claims that create distance between the two camps. Thus I also showed that, despite its being widely accepted that the different perspectives are formally equivalent, there are concrete differences in the way they conceptualise the furniture of the biological realm.
Note that I have been arbitrating a rather limited class of disputes between the two sides here. I haven’t considered problems about how to distinguish between higher-level covariance that is caused by lower-level selection and that caused by higher-level selection (Okasha & Paternotte 2012). I haven’t considered contextual approaches to measuring group selection (Goodnight 2015), or neighbour-modulated approaches to social evolution (Frank 1998) which constitute third and fourth rival camps. There may be other problems that are fatal to the views assessed here. 
There is a decision to be made regarding whether or not adaptation is conceptualised such that it can serve different purposes at different levels. There is no fact of the matter that can settle the choice for us. But once the choice is made, there are additional ontological details which we are obliged to accept, so that significant conceptual divergence emerges from the two formally equivalent perspectives.
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^1	  We have long realised, in addition, that only multicellular lineages are adapted at this level. However, unicellular lineages such as those of bacteria have tended to be marginalised in discussions of adaptation and levels of selection.
^2	  Sober and Wilson name this camp ‘individual-level functionalists’ (Sober and Wilson 1998, 10).
^3	  Note that a third approach exists which has also been called ‘group selection,’ but which uses contextual analysis, sometimes known as multiple regression, to carve selection up into different components (Goodnight 2015). I do not discuss this approach here.
^4	  For example in the case of Argentine ant supercolonies (Giraud, Pedersen & Keller 2002).
^5	  Both sides refer to this as “Williams’ Principle” after the early adaptationist George Williams.
^6	  Where, importantly, the group values may simply be averages of the member values. This is important because it means that neither Gardner and Grafen nor Sober and Wilson require groups to be understood as undergoing differential extinction (Maynard Smith 1976) or giving rise to offspring groups (Godfrey-Smith 2009), in order to manifest adaptations. 
^7	  Sober and Wilson’s definition includes “weak altruism,” where the altruists pay a cost to their relative fitness, not their absolute fitness. The opposing camp usually insist that only the “strong” form is real altruism, and that weak altruism is better understood as evolving thanks to mutual benefits (West et al. 2007). But it underlines the porosity of the dichotomy to point out that an argument similar to Sober and Wilson’s was made by Richard Dawkins. He wrote that a genetically heterogeneous plant could be expected to evolve plant-level improvements only if “the inter-plant selection pressure [is sufficiently] strong to outweigh selection among cells within plants” (Dawkins 1982, p.262).
^8	  It refers to one of the two partitions in the multilevel Price equation, in other words (Price 1972).
^9	  ‘Broad individualism’ describes a view which models selection as acting globally on individuals (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, 167).
^10	  Indeed, there is even a third use, which distinguishes higher- from lower-level selection according to contextual analysis, but I don’t discuss that meaning here.
^11	  Defined in terms of fitness-affecting interactions between the members (Sober & Wilson 1998, 92).
^12	  With thanks to Jonathan Birch for this point. Note that in any case, worker egg-eating could be selected purely for its direct nutritional benefits.
^13	  Note that while it has been the subject of recent criticism, this view of evolution as involving conflict between different forces enjoys continued support beyond this particular debate (Velasco & Hitchcock 2014).
^14	  E.g. worker egg-eating changes from being a colony-level adaptation to an adaptation of certain individuals within the colony.
^15	  In other words, in the second case, both the inclusive fitness view and the multilevel view can be compressed – the statistical partitions collapsed  - so that selection is described as the simple covariance between the traits and the fitnesses of units, where the units may be either individuals or groups.
^16	  It is worth stating that although Gardner and Grafen might call the inclusive fitness approach a single level view, because it redescribes everything from a single level, I do not consider it to be a single-level view, because the indirect component of inclusive fitness separates effects on fitness which are concealed by the single level price equation—they are higher-level effects.
